Theatricality in Installation Artworks: An Overview by Tavani, Elena
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell'estetico 12(1): 135-150, 2019
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/aisthesisAisthesis
Citation: E. Tavani (2019) Theatrical-
ity in Installation Artworks: An Over-
view. Aisthesis 12(1): 135-150. doi: 
10.13128/Aisthesis-25629
Copyright: © 2019 E. Tavani. This is 
an open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/aisthesis) 
and distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The authors 
have declared that no competing inter-
ests exist.
ISSN 2035-8466 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Aisthesis-25629
Theatricality in Installation Artworks: An 
Overview
Elena Tavani
Abstract. The article is an investigation into theatricality from various standpoints 
(among others those of Michael Fried, Claire Bishop, Juliane Rebentisch and Samuel 
Weber) in order to focus on different views on theatricality considered as partially 
emancipated from theatre and to verify if and to what extent each of them can apply 
to installation artworks as environments and intermedial devices. Ultimately the arti-
cle propounds the idea of a paradoxical anti-theatrical theatricality of installation art, 
grasped in its very connection to site-specificity, critically engaging Martin Heidegger’s 
insights regarding the «Gestell» and the «work-being» of the work of art, as a gen-
eral theoretical basis through which a particular focus of ‘specificity’ of installation is 
endorsed.
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1. INSTALL AND PUNISH 
For several decades now performance art in general has been 
bathed in a masochistic atmosphere. Sometimes displaying living 
sculptures (Josef Beyus, Marina Abramovic), filling the space with 
mixtures of deteriorated materials evoking torture chambers or kill-
ing fields – sometimes outlining an «offertorium», a «neutral social 
space» created by performance or installations, where implements 
and objects of some apparent sacred ritual are simply put on display, 
given to contemplation.
In a recent essay Hans Giesbrecht highlighted the “offertorial” 
character of the installation, its ritual structure and the potential 
cathartic effect: the Offertorium he maintains, is here conceptualized 
«by analogy to the feature of traditional Christian Mass»: “offertory” 
is the moment of ritual sequence before consecration of the host, 
which becomes metaphor for the encounter with contemporary art. 
Therefore art «becomes an energic point of contact in which the nar-
cissistic condition is momentarily reconstituted, […] rejoined with 
what it has disavowed through projective identification with the 
aggressor: its abjection» (Giesbrecht [2012]: IX, 51).
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 The offertorial scene persists, often much 
diluted, even when it does not involve restoring 
a contemplative moment of spectatorship, and 
the work instead requires an interactive response 
from the audience. The circumscribed territory of 
the work remains a ‘field’ in which the opposition 
of sacred and profane remains suspended. In the 
first case, as in Marina Abramovic’s The Artist Is 
Present (MoMa 2010), the contemplative moment 
proves to be equipped with an action force that is 
ritually very powerful – and is used as such by the 
artist. But also in the case of interactive perfor-
mances where there is a prevalence of the element 
of distraction together with curiosity and playful-
ness at the moment of entering the magic circle of 
the installation, the rituality and the reiteration, 
with few generally prescribed variants, of the same 
gestures or actions on everyone’s part, ends up by 
seriously satisfying the game of the installation 
that in the visitors finds, insatiably, its living mate-
rial. In this too the installation seems to fall into, 
albeit more weakly and with much more ‘noise’ 
compared to the happening’s communication, the 
category of the offertorium, in the sense described 
above.
Although being realized these days in many 
ways as practices that have metabolized the fluid 
and performative character of twentieth-century 
happenings and site-specific works, the multime-
dia installations of the last fifteen years tend nev-
ertheless to emphasize their nature as construction 
of sites (Rachel Whiteread, Do-Ho Suh) and to 
draw a new ambit of values and spatial and aes-
thetic potentialities, in the perceptive and evalu-
ative sense (Tavani [2018]: 136-144). At the same 
time, alongside the persistent process-based and 
non ‘objectual’ character of the installation, the 
technical challenge should also be recorded. This 
last sees the logic of the virtual–digital rebound 
onto technical devices of a mechanical type, as a 
further sounding board – and no longer neither 
primary nor exclusive – of the overall logic of the 
installation as a setup composed of heterogeneous 
aggregated materials.
There is no doubt we must bear in mind that 
since it forms part of events inserted in the circuit 
of a widespread cultural tourism, the latest fron-
tier of the «culture industry»1, the artistic instal-
lation too, as with other performing arts and as 
with architecture, must «create an experience» 
and must give way to a «sense of place» for «its 
increasingly demanding audience», becoming a 
bearer of «intangible values» that allow the artis-
tic event to compete with home entertainment in 
the market of culture-entertainment (Hammond 
[2006]: 25). It seems, however, that the installation 
appears to be equipped not just to draw on – and 
to nourish – a specific symbolic capital and thus 
to participate also in its accumulation and its prof-
its, but also to highlight the ambiguities linked to 
the particular anti-theatre ‘theatricality’ of a work 
that one wishes to be open and which, neverthe-
less, as we shall see, does not present itself in a 
total transparency. 
2. WHAT DOES «THEATRICALITY» MEAN?
Discussions on ‘theatricality’ are mainly 
referred to critic Michael Fried’s 1967 article «Art 
and Objecthood». In this context Fried was able 
to trace a new category, the Minimalist art (which 
he called «literalist art»), studying artists like Tony 
Smith, Donald Judd, Robert Morris. He points out 
that minimalist sculptures give way to «a kind of 
stage presence» similar to «the silent presence of 
another person«» (Fried [1998]: 155). Fried intro-
duces the term ‘theatricality’ as a characteristic 
that emerges from the setups of Minimalist sculp-
tors. The question arises in these terms:
What is it about objecthood as projected and hyposta-
tized by the literalists that makes it […] antithetical to 
art? The answer I want to propose is this: the literalist 
espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing other than 
a plea for a new genre of theatre, and theatre is now 
the negation of art. Literalist sensibility is theatrical 
because, to begin with, it is concerned with the actual 
circumstances in which the beholder encounters literal-
1 The term was famously introduced in 1947 by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (Horkheimer, Adorno [1947]: 94 f.).
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ist work. Morris makes it explicit. Whereas in previous 
art “what is to be had from the work is located strict-
ly within [it]” the experience of literalist art is of an 
object in a situation. One that, virtually by definition, 
includes the beholder. (Fried [1998]: 153) 
It appears evident that this approach to the-
atricality regards not so much the strategy of the 
setting up, but rather the generation of an effect 
on the visitors. Claire Bishop correctly notes that 
for Fried «theatricality does not refer to the sce-
nographic aspect of installation, but rather to the 
way in which we selfconsciously “perform” around 
it» (Bishop [2005]: 136).
In his 1980 essay on Absorption and Theatri-
cality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot 
Fried introduces the term “absorption” as opposed 
to theatricality. He considers the pictorial por-
trayal of “absorbed” actions as the outcome of an 
anti-theatrical concern, as a truthful alternative 
to theatricality, which obviously equals falsehood, 
insincerity (Fried [1980]). The study is concerned 
with French painting and art criticism from the 
early 1750s to the emergence of Jacques-Lou-
is David with his Bélisaire in the Salon of 1781. 
His argument is that during this period narrative 
paintings, genre scenes and portraits showed fig-
ures completely absorbed in what they were doing 
to the exclusion of the spectator – an absorption 
offered frequently, in Fried’s descriptions, as tied 
to a ‘state of sleep’ or to blindness – reflecting a 
deliberate choice by the artist, who unlike the 
baroque painter did not want to appeal directly to 
the beholder and involve him in the action (Scott 
[1981]: 135-136). Referring for instance to Dela-
roche Salon paintings of the 1830s, he describes 
them as «manifestly stage orientated», with too 
obvious an appeal to the beholder. Interestingly, 
Fried’s analysis points out also the new problem-
atic affinity of theatricality to the increasingly 
performing nature of modern society: «If one 
asks why beholding or spectatordom emerged 
as problematic and specifically as theatrical in 
France around the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, one cannot expect an answer in terms of 
painting alone […]. The ultimate sources of the-
atricalization of beholding must be sought in the 
social, political and economic reality of the age 
in all what bears on the history of the self» (Fried 
[1990]). There is no doubt that «the central chal-
lenge» of what Fried calls «the French antithe-
atrical tradition» was first theorized by Diderot 
(Grudin [2016]: 38). In 1762, relating to Van 
Dick’s gravure Belisarius Receiving Alms, Diderot 
argued: «Si quand on fait un tableau, on suppose 
des spectateurs, tout est perdu. Le peintre sort de 
sa toile, comme l’acteur qui parle au parterre sort 
de la scene. En supposant qu’il n’y a personne au 
monde que les personnages du tableau, celui de 
Vandick est sublime» (Diderot [1958]: 57)2. To 
him however, the statement «if, when one makes 
a painting one supposes beholders, everything is 
lost» entails a focus on a variety of strategies for 
facing this problem. Fried, on the contrary, syn-
thetizes the antitheatrical strategy as «absorp-
tive closure, the walling out or curtaining off of 
the beholder standing before the picture» (Fried 
[1996]: 262).
Bodily pantomime, the rhetorical acting style, 
with measured movements and a set of emotions 
embodied by the performer, was in any case fash-
ionable in eighteenth-century France and Diderot 
resolutely criticized it as a false embodiment of 
sensations and emotions and for its tendency to 
result empty and opaque. Fried points out the 
importance of this critique. However, in his read-
ing of Diderot’s position, Fried goes on looking 
for absorbed gestures, considered as expression of 
a “natural” language of the portrayed characters 
(Smyth [2014]), even if something different, and 
more interesting for our focus on installation art, 
could be grasped from Diderot’s art criticism and 
theory of spectatorship.
Fried does not conceal the ambiguity of 
Diderot’s position: «The fiction of physically enter-
ing a painting or group of paintings plays a much 
larger role in the Salon de 1767 than in the two 
previous ones» and «it is in the long and famous 
section on Joseph Vernet (1714-1789), unani-
mously regarded by French critics of the 1750s 
2 Quoted in Fried [1980]: 148.
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and 1760s as the greatest landscape and marine 
painter of the age, that the fiction of physically 
entering a group of paintings receives its fullest, 
most intensive development» (Fried [1988]: 122).
Diderot writes actually in the same salon both 
that «une scene representé sur la toile, ou sur les 
planches, ne suppose pas des témoins» (Salon 
1767, Promenade Vernet)3, maintaining the fiction 
that the beholder does not exist, and that land-
scape and ruin painters should by their truth to 
nature «force» the spectator to enter the canvas. 
Fried registers, so to say, the anti-theatricality of 
the double behavior prescribed by Diderot to the 
beholder: absence from the scene as a witness, 
presence in the scene as part of it, “absorbed” in it, 
but does not seem to be willing to grasp the new 
meaning of the term absorption in Diderot’s fic-
tion. Now the scene has freed itself from canvas 
and salon and is presented in its full liveness as 
an environmental situation asking for perceptive 
and emotional responses. In his commentaries to 
Diderot, Fried does not seem to be perfectly aware 
of how Diderot’s idea of theatricality is brought 
to come to terms with the performance of the 
beholder, through a sort of aesthetic assimilation 
of the beholder him/herself in an absorbed atti-
tude. Surprisingly, he also describes as moments 
of absorption the affective and aesthetic results of 
the imaginative projections of the beholder into 
the depicted scene. When for instance Diderot 
urges his companion (the abbot who, in the fiction 
of the storytelling, takes a walk with him inside 
the picture) to mimically lie down next to some 
animals in the middle of an arcadian environment 
– with a shepherd, a peasant woman, in the midst 
of «the rustic sounds of the cowherd» (Diderot 
[1975])4 – what strikes us is first of all the move-
ment of the viewer changing his condition of 
viewer with the condition of an actor: a character 
sharing the same scene of the depicted characters.
Fried ignores the cause (the artificial means 
of the painting inducing immersion into it) and 
insists just on the effect (the absorption of the 
3 Quoted in Scott [1981]: 136.
4 Quoted in Fried [1980]: 120.
viewer) demonstrating no interest in the technical 
and artistic device from which arises the sensorial 
alarm perceived by Diderot during his “immer-
sions” in Vernet’s landscapes and seascapes. 
Can we obtain from this some useful clue in 
order to focus attention on theatricality as spe-
cifically related to installation art? Of course we 
should be rather cautious in outlining the terrain 
and the surroundings of our question. A sort of 
about turn here may appear to be a not particu-
larly new strategy, even perhaps obsolete given the 
object under analysis (distinguishing a territory 
from that which remains at its edges) with regard 
to the generally accepted and irreversible ten-
dency towards a collapse of the barriers between 
the various forms of art, which is evidenced unin-
terruptedly not only from the beginning of the 
1960s, but which has more recently been insist-
ently attributed to a performative turn. It seems 
difficult to put forward any doubts regarding this 
turn and at the most it is possible to re-evaluate 
its nature as an epochal turn, considered as such 
even in Fried’s above-mentioned notes in respect 
of the “performative nature of modern society”, 
with which however, according to Fried, individu-
al arts have to engage in hostilities, if they want to 
preserve «quality and value», against the «illusion» 
that the barriers between the arts are «in a process 
of crumbling» (Fried [1998]: 164).
Let us therefore seek to focus, drawing freely 
on some issues from the authors taken into con-
sideration up to now, on the possible character 
of mise en scène of the artistic installation and its 
eventual anti-theatricality.
Fried’s attempt remains unsatisfactory because 
his antagonism proves itself unable to come to 
terms with modern artistic phenomena (like 
minimalism) not showing what he calls “modern-
ist sensibility”. His main claim is that modernist 
art (including Brecht’s and Artaud’s theatre) can 
«defeat» theatricality such as the stage presence of 
minimalist artworks, «by virtue of their present-
ness and instantaneousness» (Fried [1998]: 167). 
Whereas “presentness” is supposed to reveal the 
absolute presence and autonomy of the artwork, 
“instantaneousness” has to convey the idea of 
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immediate grasp, intuition of a symbolic mean-
ing. Summarizing, Fried’s antagonism «is directed 
against an art that is offered to the viewer not in 
the mode of aesthetic representation, but, on the 
contrary, by virtue of its literalness or mere object-
hood» (Rebentisch [2003]: 69). With Artaud and 
Brecht in mind he contends «Theater and theatri-
cality are at war today, not simply with modernist 
painting (or modernist painting and sculpture), 
but with art as such and – to the extent that the 
different arts can be described as modernist – with 
modernist sensibility as such» (Fried [1998]: 163). 
Evidently all the reiterated attempts by modern 
theatre to rethink and reactivate the relationship 
with the audience in a different and performative 
way find an echo in what Fried calls «inclusion 
of the beholder» in minimal art, an outcome that 
he rejects because he considers it to be linked to 
the grammar of the work as object, as something 
«existing in order to be looked at». (Rebentisch 
[2003]: 40-41) In Fried’s view therefore all mod-
ern theatre’s efforts to find ways either to reduce 
the «distance» of the beholder or to integrate him/
her in the stage situation, cannot avoid introducing 
a type of theatrical relationship. The very antidote 
to and weapon of choice against this destination of 
the work that keeps it in a condition of theatrical-
ity, of «structural existence for an audience» (Fried 
[1998]: 140) and in a relationship of dependency 
on the ‘perspectives’ assumed by the observer, is 
what Fried defines as «continuous and entire pre-
sentness» (Fried [1998]: 167, italics mine).
For Fried, theatricality is associated not with 
representation, but with the literal use of the 
objects and with a “literalist sensibility” which 
proves reluctant to convey meaning: «like the 
shape of the object, the materials do not represent, 
signify, or allude to anything; they are what they 
are and nothing more» (Fried [1998]: 165). To 
some extent Fried’s descriptions demonstrate that 
his critique of the literalness of Minimal art «is 
based on the uncritical adoption» of a quasi posi-
tivist «self-misunderstanding on the part of cer-
tain Minimal artists» (Rebentisch [2012]: 69). But 
first of all they demonstrate his attempt to oppose 
to a presumed “literalist sensibility” (Fried [1998]: 
166) a modernist sensibility, «concerned with the 
conventions that constitute individual arts’ respec-
tive essences» (Fried [1998]: 164) and able to offer 
artworks as wholly meaningful in their quality, 
value and symbolism. Unlike literalist artworks, 
modernist artworks do not happen to be double 
legible (as thing and as sign) or to be experienced 
in their «endlessness or inexhaustibility», caused 
either by the indeterminacy of their own meaning 
or by the «complicity» extorted from the beholder, 
accepting the «uncanny presence» (Fried [1998]: 
155) and enigmatic nature of the artistic object, 
its ambiguity, «the look of nonart» (Greenberg 
[1993]: 256).
Paradoxically enough, however, presentness, for 
Fried «the depth and fullness» of artwork’s pres-
entation, considered as antagonist with regard to 
the “theatricality” of those works which are funda-
mentally rooted in their «double presence as things 
and signs» (Fried [1998]: 143), has constituted for 
many years through the 1900s the guiding thread 
of the New Theatre’s search for a theatricality that 
often by concentrating on presence and presenta-
tion as values opposed to interpretation and repre-
sentation has played an anti-theatrical game. 
My claim is that Fried’s wish for a «future sur-
vival» of modernist arts – depending on the abil-
ity of individual works «to overcome the theatrical 
[…], to suspend or defeat their own objecthood» 
(Fried [1998]: 196) – should more usefully have 
been addressed to individual artworks and to anti-
work positions as such, insofar as they can estab-
lish their specificity (instead of their «identity» as 
painting, poetry etc.) – eventually, not necessarily 
however, even suspending their objecthood, their 
theatricality, or also their identity or formalized 
meaningfulness.
We can say that much of anti-theatrical 
research in Modern theatre, which takes as its 
point of departure the theatralization of any site 
(Craig [1911]) and comes to the theorization of 
the theatrical space as environment (Schechner 
[2006]) has to be understood as an intense inquiry 
into spectatorship, creative writing and designing 
of a space, migrated or flowed towards the whole 
questioning engaged by installation art, whose 
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experimental nature, in both “objective” and “sub-
jective” aesthetic discourse, aims at the construc-
tion of a “site” whose final form remains that of a 
steadily boundary-crossing spaced-situation.
This sort of genealogy can be traced, it seems 
to me, not only and not principally for that genre 
of installation that envisages a happening, as in 
the case of Marina Abramovic’s The Artist Is Pre-
sent. Indeed, also in site-specific and transmedial 
installations a theatricality is readable both in the 
sense of the setup, in the overall and dynamic 
“placement” of objects and devices, able to present 
its own specific environmental or atmospheric 
quality, and in the sense of «the inclusion of the 
beholder», of the “contract” arranged with the 
visitors, in terms of mutual supply of performance 
inside the exibition venue of the installation. In 
synthesis, we can say that a theatricality refer-
able to installation art will regard prevalently the 
aspect of the setup/mise en scène and the aspect 
of the execution. It is quite evident indeed that 
while in happenings and in all cases of temporal 
arts «there is a need for an executant» or mediat-
ing artist supposed to be his/her own interpreter 
in performance (Urmson [2018]: 351-2), in instal-
lation artworks the need for “execution” passes to 
the audience who become, so to say, executant-
visiting audience. But the passage cannot rely on 
a «recipe or set of instructions for performing or 
executant» audience, because of the twofold clas-
sification of installation artwork: a nontemporal 
art containing suggestions for temporal-spatial 
execution. The single visitors occupy physically 
the installation’s delimited space standing or mov-
ing across the space available: they interpret and 
witness the installation and in both these activi-
ties the beholder-participants mediate between the 
proposal of the artist and its realization exhibited 
as a sort of «instructed situation». I cannot dis-
cuss here the question of whether participants 
are co-producer of the installation as situation5. I 
5 This is, according to Claire Bishop, a consequence of the 
artistic orientation towards the social in the 1990s, whose 
“hallmark” has been «a shared set of desires to overturn 
the traditional relationship between the art object, the 
think I can say, however, as an initial approxima-
tion, that the performance of visitors in an artistic 
installation is more culturally revealing than ena-
bling: though we cannot refer to it as a «restored 
behaviour» (Schechner [1985]), as in real theatri-
cal or ritual circumstances, actions and reactions 
of the beholder in the installation environment 
can to some extent be referred to as an execution 
(of the program of the device) which is not just 
behaviour, but also a performance as a series of 
performative deeds – in the wake of the linguistic 
performative acts described by John Austin, which 
make things happen (Austin [1962]). In any case 
the debate focused around performative and per-
formance studies is still open and I refer to it here 
in a much abbreviated manner6.
Thus wishing to circumscribe the question in 
these pages to the theatricality referable specifical-
ly to the art of installation, the fundamental ques-
tion becomes: does the artistic installation owe 
its value and power of presence principally to the 
exhibition setup in the sense of the mise en scène? 
But again, wishing to reduce to a minimum the 
obscurity of the terms used, it will be necessary to 
indicate what can mise en scène mean in the envi-
ronmental space of the installation.
In a piece dedicated to opera, Theodor Ador-
no has remarked that the stage coincides with 
the dramatic form: «According to its own logic, 
dramatic form implies the audience. It would be 
absurd to conceive of a stage in itself the same 
way in which one can conceive of poetry in itself, 
or of music in itself» (Adorno [1955]: 20). Here 
he is eager above all to bring out the distinction 
between the musical work, clearly “theatrical”, 
and its components taken in isolation and not yet 
dealt with in light of a theatrical setup, the text 
of the libretto and the music. For us this is only 
one note among many to try to understand if each 
mise en scène proves ultimately to be oriented to 
the dramatic form (according to the etymon drán 
artist and the audience» (Bishop [2012]: 2). 
6 For an overview on this subject see Schechner [2013], 
Davies [2018], Deriu [2013], Mersch [2002], Summa 
[2018].
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= action) and to theatricality intended in this 
sense, extendable to the eventual participation 
or co-authorality of the spectators, or whether it 
can manifest on a different plane, more linked to 
its character as constructed situation, a term that 
clearly is borrowed from the lexis of the Situation-
ists. In other words, not dealing with a setup of a 
scenographic type, useful in delimiting and quali-
fying a scene variously, the installation planning 
of an art installation needs, it would seem, to be 
read trying to investigate from more nearby what 
is actually installed and thus what comes out of its 
exposition and its exhibition. A stage “in itself ” is 
nonsense, Adorno claims. From this starting point 
we can begin to understand the installation as a 
setting arranging itself in the form of a self-place-
ment and virtually framing and foreseeing a set of 
interobjective and intersubjective engagements to 
be produced in the time of the exhibition by vir-
tue of the presence of the audience.
3. INSTALLATION AS PERFORMING VENUE
Artist Ilya Kabakov observed that although 
there is no «comprehensive answer to the ques-
tion of what an installation is», it would neverthe-
less be possible «to explain that type of installation 
that we can call “total” as that installation that is 
made in such a way that the observer (together 
with various components that accompany the 
observer) who arrives within it is taken by it» 
(Kabakov [1995]: 13).
A characteristic of Kabakov’s installations is 
that of not proposing any «formal reduction to 
simple base elements dealt with in a minimalist 
form» (Hinkes [2017]: 277). On the contrary the 
artist works with quasi-realistic means, integrating 
everyday objects within the installations, so as to 
render them “interieurs” – whether they are single 
rooms or apartments or buildings. Juliane Reben-
tisch has called «dramatization» the way Kaba-
kov’s work, particularly his multi-room installa-
tions, direct the viewer, «explicitly incorporating 
the viewer’s trajectory into the artistic calculation» 
(Rebentisch [2012]: 159). Yet, there is another 
theatrical horizon characterizing the productive 
moment of Kabakov’s work. Kabakov has defined 
the total installation «site of an interrupted action. 
A place in which an event has taken place, is tak-
ing place or can take place» (Kabakov [1995]: 16). 
This mention of the event is not a chance one: it 
is a precise reference to a «dramaturgy of the total 
installation» that intends to bring the installation 
work closer to the area of film and above all the 
theatre. It is indeed possible «to present all the 
objects in the installation as theatre actors, accord-
ing to a typology of roles well known to anyone at 
the theatre: the soloist, the chorus, the extras» all 
of these roles that evidently can be filled also by 
ordinary everyday objects (Kabakov [1995]: 61). 
This involves a meticulous attention for the pres-
ence of objects in an installation also described 
in terms of stage. A stage without actors. I believe 
there is a certain relevance to our theme in under-
standing the meaning of this absence. Kabakov 
provides a key (it is an «action in a state of peace-
fulness») that however presents many margins of 
ambiguity. Nevertheless, and perhaps precisely due 
to the ambiguity of the formula proposed by the 
artist, «an action in a state of peacefulness», other 
interpretations have been given, which however 
do not seem to acknowledge the real point of the 
question, which regards the setting up and the 
functions (the roles) with which each object intro-
duced must be able to be charged with in light 
of the reciprocal relationships that come to oper-
ate within the setup. For example, Juliane Reben-
tisch provides an interpretation, doubtless plausi-
ble, in which Kabakov’s installations recall theatre 
stages that the observer inspects during the inter-
val, stage sets that are momentarily deserted. On 
the one hand then they are “inszenierte Räume”, 
spaces belonging to a mise en scène within the 
museum space, which due to a precise desire of 
the artist must not dissimulate their artificial char-
acter; on the other hand they are scenic spaces 
abandoned by the actors and because of this at 
the mercy of the visitors (Rebentisch [2012]: 156). 
While the first type of theatricality is doubtless 
to be attributed to the artist’s installations, it is 
only by forcing the matter somewhat that we can 
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talk of an absent action because of the absence of 
actors, also for the reason that in this case the first 
point would be refused, i.e. the artificiality of the 
entire installation operation: the scene, the stage, 
is not a scene in the literal sense and that is why 
we must not imagine it as abandoned by flesh and 
blood actors, as the effect of an illusion. It is a fact, 
however, that it is the very artist who encourages 
this type of reading. This happens when Kabak-
ov posits that in the environment of the installa-
tion the viewer should have the feeling that «the 
place where he finds himself has been inhabited 
for a long time already, that people lived and live 
in it, furthermore, that they have just left and will 
return any minute now» (Kabakov [1995]: 276-
277). A fundamental character of the setup is its 
having already been inhabited and its remaining 
inhabitable in future; this confers an atmospheric 
density to the site that «overcomes» the viewer, 
who nevertheless must be able to feel him-/her-
self within the total installation, completely free 
to examine and judge the environment and the 
single objects present (Kabakov [1995]: 245). For 
this same reason Kabakov considers the «social 
recognisability» of the spaces and their arrange-
ment (rooms, corridors, etc.) to be of extreme 
importance for the “total installation”. These must 
operate in such a way as to present themselves as 
«social milieu», linked to life and to all its funda-
mental problems.
The agency therefore that is to be attributed 
to the installations cannot but be the recipro-
cal reference to the elements and the assumption 
of roles within the installation, bearing in mind 
the hierarchy (between main and minor roles) 
inscribed in the score that structures the presence 
of the objects. This is, in other terms, an agency 
that consists of the activation of a dynamic of the 
elements that is however already fundamentally 
inscribed in the device of their presentation and 
only in part can be activated by the visitors and 
give rise to an event, be it past, present or future. 
In this sense, I believe, and therefore not on the 
basis of a literal reference to the theatre as tempo-
ral art, the installation presents «the character of 
a time-based art» (Kabakov [1995]: 311). In other 
words, the reference to the agency is not literally 
referred to the actions carried out by other sub-
jects that are no longer present, but still to the 
setup in its revealing a lived character, as place 
and environment set up so as to testify to previous 
passages.
Kabakov seems to put forward a field of 
action of the installation that keeps itself in bal-
ance between tradition and innovation; on the 
one hand the idea of total installation seems 
rooted in the conviction of a “totalizing” capac-
ity of technique (which for the artist is translated 
into a construction that envisages an almost total 
“government” of the visitors’ reactions) and on the 
other elicits a perception of the space-time of the 
installation in the direction of «plastic sensations» 
linked to the forms of the objects, to the roles that 
they play in the entirety of the installation and to 
what we might call their character as ruins, their 
capacity for storing history. How does late instal-
lation art relate to (over the last fifty years) the 
growing intertwining of artforms and the growing 
surpassing of the distinction between art and non-
art? And how does its inter-mediality relate with 
the idea of the «total work» as famously proposed 
by Wagner? Wagner maintained that the individu-
al arts, in particular dance, music, poetry, should 
meet in their respective capacities for direct-
ing themselves to «Leibesmensch», to «Gefühls-
mensch» and to «Verstandesmensch», leading to 
the expression of the fundamental aspects of being 
human, so as to restore body, feeling and intellect 
to the entire man (see Fischer-Lichte [2010]: 20).
According to Fischer-Lichte it is possible to 
read the theory of Gesamtkunswerk as an “inter-
art” aesthetic, but only if we do not accept the 
organicistic solution provided by Wagner and we 
return rather to the questions he set out from and 
which he asked himself, leaving them open. That 
is the possibilities opened up for aesthetic experi-
ence on the one hand by the meeting of various 
arts; and on the other the way in which the arts 
involved in this meeting are also transformed – 
as Wagner maintained was what happened in the 
Gesamtkunstwerk (Fischer-Lichte [2010]: 22). So 
it will be useful to note a “performativization” of 
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the individual arts (and here the model would be 
Untitled Event by John Cage) and also the circum-
stance that the effect of «hybridization» and of 
Hybridbildung cannot but find itself in opposition 
to the Gesamtkunstwerk, it not being a formation 
of a hierarchical or hegemonic character (Fischer-
Lichte [2010]: 26, 28). The author notably empha-
sizes the trasformative power of theatre and per-
formances and reads theatricality according to this 
main feature. While I believe that her account fits 
well within theatrical and performative studies, 
I have some concern regarding the possibility of 
applying such remarks to the field of installation 
art in order to grasp its peculiar theatricality.
In her essay on Installation Art Claire Bishop 
considers “dream” as an appropriate analogy for 
Kabakov’s «total installation» in a phenomenologi-
cal respect. She recalls that Sigmund Freud in his 
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) had described 
the experience of a dream stressing a few main 
features: its being primarily visual («dreams think 
essentially in images»), its liveness («dreams con-
struct a situation» that «we appear not to think 
but to experience»), its composite structure, that 
is meant to be not exactly decoded, but just ana-
lysed through free-association, through individual 
affective and verbal connections. These three fea-
tures, Bishop maintains – «the sensory immediacy 
of conscious perception, a composite structure, 
and the elucidation of meaning through free-asso-
ciation, precisely correspond to a model of view-
ing experience found in the “total installation” as 
described by Kabakov» (Bishop [2005]: 7). This 
suggestion comes actually from Kabakov’s own 
description of how the total installation operates 
on the viewer: «the main motor of the total instal-
lation, what it lives by, [is] the cranking up of the 
wheel of associations, cultural or everyday analo-
gies, personal memories» (Kabakov [1995]). Natu-
rally nothing forbids our following, in the analysis 
of a work, the artist’s suggestions, which although 
being in any case significant, evidently cannot 
be bound to a reading of a critical nature. In this 
regard I would like above all to note that the ref-
erence to the ability of each dream element to be 
replaced by an associative word or syllable as the 
dream’s third (Freudian) main feature, if applied 
tout court to the aesthetic experience of an instal-
lation risks centring the reading exclusively on 
the imaginative projection of the visitors and on 
their capacity for symbolic–rational reconstruc-
tion of the event, leaving the matter of the setup 
of the work, its constructional aspect, completely 
to one side. This aspect specifically concerns the 
construction of a position and a presence that is sui 
generis within the exhibition space and is not only 
the creation of a situation and an atmosphere. 
What we are dealing with, if we wish, are two 
antithetical forms of theatricality, one «absorbed» 
in its own exhibitional configuration and structure 
in the specific act of taking up position or being 
installed in the available space, the other perceived 
and experienced by the visitors in a prevalently 
emotive and projective form, based on the spe-
cific experience of each one. For this reason I do 
not consider the categorization criterion proposed 
by Bishop to be sufficient – as installation art 
requires its audience to physically enter the art-
work in order to experience it, installation pieces 
can be categorized by the type of experience they 
provide for the viewing subject. Indeed, although 
there is reference to the necessity that the visitors 
enter into the installation physically, the «psycho-
motorial» aspect of this experience is ignored in 
the cognitive motives that it shares with the «sym-
bolic–reconstructive» aspect (Antinucci [2004]) 
(which in any case receives more emphasis) and 
ends up by being observed e parte subjecti only as 
behaviour (it is the visitors’ performance) while e 
parte objecti, i.e. from the installation’s perspective, 
is made to coincide with the device of the “inclu-
sion of the viewer” envisaged by its own setup. In 
both cases, however, it is not easy for the analysis 
to put itself forward as immanent to the installa-
tion piece in its particularity and it tends rather 
to be the result of a gaze that sits outside of the 
phenomenon analysed – a gaze from above. Fur-
thermore, focussing above all on the symbolic and 
conceptual result of the experience, which is what 
we do in the immersive scene of the installation 
artwork, insofar as it «requires creative free-asso-
ciation in order to articulate its meaning; in order 
144 Elena Tavani
to do this, the installation’s assemblaged elements 
are taken one by one and read “symbolically” – as 
metonymic parts of a narrative» (ibid) the specific 
cognitive contribution referable to the psychomo-
torial character of the experience is diluted, sacri-
ficed to the objective of grasping its presumptively 
conceptual and functional meaning as in a story-
telling.
In sum, one last objection to Bishop’s pro-
posed reading applied to Kabakov’s installation 
practice, is that in the case examined, there is a 
risk of neglecting precisely any reference to the 
“total” character of the installation, which must in 
any case have some expression in the experience 
we have of it in terms of a “situation”. We need to 
have a grasp of the overall form and structure of 
the whole installation’s architecture, in order to 
acquire familiarity and to not lose our orientation, 
despite the various disorienting “uncanny” details 
spread along the pathway.
4. INSTALLATION AS RE-PRESENTATION.
Let us now summarize some of the points we 
have been collecting up to this point: the instal-
lation threshold does not work as a stage curtain, 
and what stands out is not the idea of a represen-
tation in the sense of a rehearsal, but the setting 
of the work as circumscribed and as “in motion” 
at the same time7. Also because a “theatricality” of 
installation artwork comes to the fore as effect of 
a suspension of time: the temporal logic of instal-
lation diverges necessarily from any «external his-
torical narrative» (Hartoonian [2018]: 40 f.)
Here theatricality does not emerge main-
ly from the self-staging of installation as hortus 
conclusus – however open it might appear – but 
7 Andrew Benjamin correctly maintains that the art-
work’s presence has to be “sustained” by its audience and 
by the work’s own agency: is not so much the object in 
itself «but the continual questioning of the object […] the 
sustained presence of the work, part of whose work is to 
raise and maintain the question of the [work]» (Benjamin 
[1994]: 17)
instead from what we could call the installation 
strategies of metastaging, overcoming theatricality 
as “placement”: its way of emerging as a perform-
ing venue inside an “installed environment”.
Not only in Kabakov, but in many installation 
pieces the “situation” as being-posited plays on an 
ambiguity that presents some particular traits of 
theatricality. On the one hand its site-specificity, 
which allows visitors to have an aesthetic experi-
ence – considered such prevalently in the percep-
tive and emotional–affective sphere – that is par-
ticularly intense due to the environmental immer-
sivity that characterizes installation art, but also 
due to its liveness. The single visitors occupy phy-
sically the installation’s delimited space standing 
or moving across the space available: they inter-
pret and witness at the same time the installation. 
In both these activities spectators-participants 
mediate between the proposal of the artist and 
its realization as an “instructed situation” with its 
need to be indefinitely executed, accepting to be 
part of, so to say, an executant-visiting audience of 
the installation piece.
On the other hand is the installation’s presen-
tation as a picking up on and a repetition of eve-
ryday mundane elements, as a mediation towards 
reflection on those elements, though often under-
taken by the installation domain proposing a 
studied omission of all écarts which would pos-
sibly enact «instituting processes» (Merleau-Ponty 
[2010]: 8, f.), based on the installation’s divergenc-
es from mundane situational norms.
Also in order to avoid understanding its par-
ticular “theatricality” in a too literal theatrical 
direction, this is a type of repetition that I think 
can be usefully read as a “presentification” in the 
sense suggested by Husserl in Ideen 1. I refer to 
the possibility, which Husserl calls “neutrality 
modification”, conceived of according to a distin-
ction between neutrality and positionality (Hus-
serl [1983]: § 111, 115), of counterpositing to an 
attitude of passivity – linked to the ‘posit’ on the 
part of the conscious something existing or having 
been in memory – an activity of re-presentation, 
equipped too with material content, that tenden-
tially neutralizes and suspends the being avail-
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able (Vorhandensein) of the natural world (§ 31), 
opening up to a free imagination and reflection. 
We can think of the installation as a particular 
type of “positing”, re-presentation that presents 
the object-image made up of the installation as 
existing-so-to-speak. Evidently the installation, 
as a re-presentation of situations, has leverage 
on the appearance of a relation of contiguity and 
continuity with regard to situations posited as nor-
mative, miming them in a paradoxical counter-
position that while it neutralizes them does not 
renounce playing on a multiform and changeable 
dynamic of the positing and being-posited of the 
“difference” it aims to produce.
5. THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
I want to address here another aspect of the 
problem, namely, the property of theatricality to 
transform a space in a place. In his Theatricality as 
Medium Samuel Weber discusses this issue, look-
ing for the meaning of theatricality in relation to 
theatre, film and electronic media. He first refers 
to theatricality in baroque theatre, characterized 
by «ostentation» (Weber [2004]: 270); then to 
theatricality and psychoanalysis: the use of verbs 
with the same root stellen (to place) by Freud to 
indicate distortions and suppressions of events 
according to Weber indicates the importance that 
the placement of memories assumes, a fact that 
«underscores the theatrical nature of the masquer-
ade» (Weber [2004]: 282). In particular Weber’s 
study of the concept of theatricality concentrates 
attention, whether the medium of theatre or film 
is introduced into the field, on the question of 
the locality that defines an operational space and 
therefore also on the need to find a collocation 
or an appropriate position for the carrying out of 
precise operations. In this sense the theatricaliza-
tion consists in circumscribing a field of action 
and in cutting out from a space a specific site. 
Highlighting, for example, the role that the catego-
ry of detachment plays in Genet’s theatre, Weber 
observes how in this case «the fixity of theatrical 
space is the condition of an act of recognition»: 
what has to be recognised is the responsibility of 
theatre itself «as parodic detachment». (Weber 
[2004]: 310-311) In fact for Genet «theatre is the 
repetition of detachment, of division and of mul-
tiplication, by which the singular becomes many 
and the many singular» (Weber [2004]: 312).
A further issue Weber investigates in his book 
concerns what is meant by expressions such as 
«the theatre of operation», which allows him to 
deal with the non-aesthetic, military, use of thea-
tre
as a medium in which conflicting forces strive to 
secure the perimeter of a place in dispute. “Theater” 
signifies the imposition of borders rather than a rep-
resentational-aesthetic genre. The former focuses upon 
the manner in which a place is secured, whereas the 
latter regards the place as already taken or given, and 
therefore as a means or instrument of that which is to 
be represented. In respect to its mediality, then, theat-
ricality is defined as a problematic process of placing, 
framing, situating rather than as a process of repre-
sentation. (Weber [2004]: 315. Weber’s italics)
Weber exemplifies this statement with an analy- 
sis of the way the Spike Jonze film Being John 
Malkovich (1999) «doubles and thereby divides 
the convergence of image and person that other- 
wise functions as the condition of Hollywood star-
dom», and thus deconstructs the idea of individ-
uality as a self-contained subject (Weber [2004]: 
316-317). The body is not a barrier against that 
which is external to the subject, guarding its 
organic life: rather, Malkovich’s body becomes a 
kind of apartment house or, better, a dwelling for 
transients. The body emerges both as a temporary 
container and as an observation post, something 
like a loge in a theater. After a period of obser-
vation, however, the observation post takes on a 
more military character – it becomes a forward 
command post that does not merely observe, but 
increasingly controls the body it is “in” (Weber 
[2004]: 317). The body becomes the arena of «a 




The idea of linking the categories proposed by 
Heidegger in On Origin of the Work of Art (1935) 
and in The Question Concerning Technology (1953) 
to that type of artistic operation that is called 
‘installation’ is certainly not new, also because in 
many ways it is induced by some translational 
solutions from the term Gestell that have empha-
sized the meaning of “installation”8. In The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology Heidegger maintains 
that «technology is no mere means. Technology is 
a way of revealing» (QT, 12); and explains: «Tech-
nology comes to presence (west) in the realm 
where revealing and unconcealment take place, 
where alêtheia, truth, happens» (QT, 13). What 
is at stake in modern technology is the revealing 
of a challenge: nature is asked «to supply energy 
that can be extracted and stored as such» (QT, 14). 
Gestell, enframing, is according to Heidegger the 
word which means this challenging and «reveals 
the real in the mode of ordering, as standing 
reserve» (QT, 20), and yet «the word stellen (to set 
upon) in the name Ge-stell not only means chal-
lenging. At the same time it should preserve the 
suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems, 
namely, that of producing and presenting (Her- 
und Dar-stellen) which, in the sense of poiesis, lets 
what is-present come forth into unconcealment» 
(QT, 21, transl. modified).
The structure of a self-revealing and latency 
of the meaning of the real had been described by 
Heidegger almost twenty years before in terms of 
a tension between “world” and “earth” inside the 
work of art:
World and earth are essentially different from one 
another and yet are never separated. The world 
grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through 
world. But the relation between world and earth does 
not wither away into the empty unity of opposites 
unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting 
upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening 
8 From now on, respectively, OWA and QT. For instance, 
the French translation for “Gestell” by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe is “installation”. Quote Rebentisch [2003]: 232. 
it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, 
as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the 
world into itself anf keep it there. The opposition of 
world and earth is striving […]. In setting up a world 
and setting forth the earth, the world is an instigating 
of this striving. This does not happen so that the work 
should at the same time settle and put an end to the 
conflict in an insipid agreement, but so that the strife 
may remain a strife. (OWA, 48-49)
In fact Ge-Stell, if taken literally, would then 
be the collective name for all sorts of placing, put-
ting, setting, arranging, ordering, or in general, 
putting in place. And Gestalt suggests that the ten-
sions of the work of art can be framed and can 
find a setting up in a figure.
Various interpreters have grasped this point 
and even in the limited context of this path of 
ours we can record two cases (Rebentisch and 
Weber) of a reconsideration, more or less critical, 
of the questions raised by Heidegger in the texts 
quoted. In dealing with these readings we will see, 
however, as we will seek to argue, that the recon-
sideration conceals some traps, although some of 
the aspects discussed can, under certain condi-
tions, contribute towards a definition of a specific 
position of the work – and therefore also of the 
installation work’s site-specificity – that is more 
circumstantial from the theoretical point of view. 
In On Origin of the Work of Art one of the 
points of greatest difficulty is the counterposition 
of «earth» and «world». The world enters into a 
«striving» with the earth and «the work-being of 
the work» exists in this striving which emerges 
as a striving between self opening and sheltering-
concealing of a historical truth content. Samuel 
Weber concentrates his reading exactly on «the 
disputant, clearing and concealing» the truth. 
He correctly points out how Heidegger’s use of 
words stemming from “stellen” is functional to 
draw attention to the necessary specificity of the 
“opening” of truth: the truth «installs itself» in 
the opening of «a space of strife and play» (Weber 
[2004]: 53).
In a later addendum (1960) to the text On 
Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger remarks that 
an «essential ambiguity» is noted in regard to 
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the definition of art as «the setting-into-work of 
truth». In this ambiguity, truth is subject on the 
one hand and object on the other: «it remains 
undecided (but decidable) who does the setting or 
in what way it occurs» (addendum OWA, 85-6). 
With regard to the setting Heidegger argues that 
«we must think of to “place” in the sense of thesis» 
and not in the sense of fixing something in place. 
(OWA, 81) Thesis for ancient Greeks «means a set-
ting up in the unconcealed». For instance, «let-
ting a statue be set up» means «bringing (it) here 
into the unconcealed, bringing (it) forth into what 
is present» (OWA, 81). In other words the Greek 
sense of thesis is «to let lie forth in its radiance 
and presence». (OWA, 82)
Juliane Rebentisch dwells on the ambiguity 
of the setting up of a work, seeing there however 
not so much (as occurs in the detail provided by 
Heidegger) the question of the truth event as such, 
but the question of the aesthetic experience, gi-
ven that if we talk of the manifestation of a truth 
we understand it in substance «as an indefinite 
event that essentially plays out between receiving 
subject and aesthetic object» (Rebentisch [2003]: 
238). This is a guiding thread that runs through 
the author’s entire study: the same problem of the 
relationship variously understood as subject and 
object is met for example as a dissimulated prob-
lem but still for all this internal to the criticism of 
the theatricality of art, in terms of stage presence 
or inclusion of the viewer (Rebentisch [2003]: 
70–71), or even of an absorption or dehumaniza-
tion of the viewer, as in the idea of the “object-
hood” of Minimalist art theorized by Fried.
And also with regard to the Heideggerian 
idea of “Gestell” Rebentisch looks to its internally 
antagonistic structure as that which can render 
this idea «aesthetic» and not instead connected, as 
occurs in Heidegger, with the historicity of being. 
This antagonism would lead, according to a con-
sciously divergent reading compared to the direc-
tion proposed by Heidegger, towards «a specifi-
cally aesthetic opening of asymmetrical subject–
object relationships» (Rebentisch [2003]: 237). 
On the other hand, «the double trait» referred 
by Heidegger to sculpture’s “making room” for 
the region «as granting and arranging» according 
to Rebentisch «can also be read […] as aesthetic 
antagonism […] to the internal antagonism of the 
– aesthetically conceived – Gestell on the basis of 
which, we recall, Heidegger believed the concept 
of form/shape/figure (Gestalt) would need to be 
rethought as well» (Rebentisch [2003]: 242-243).
In contrast to what is underlined by Reben-
tisch in her reading, I believe it is necessary to 
highlight how, within the structure of the becom-
ing-event in the truth of the work, the ambiguity 
does not remain circumscribed to the who pos-
its, but regards also the way of appearing, in the 
conviction that it is precisely in this direction that 
there is greater need to dwell, both to understand 
a certain aspect of undecidability that impacts on 
the dynamic of opening–closing conceived of as a 
struggle, and to grasp the significance of the end 
result. Heidegger claims that «the work-being of 
the work» exists in the «striving between world 
and earth» (OWA, 49-50). Heidegger adds that 
«the strife may remain a strife» (OWA, 48-49) if 
the world does not settle down, and the earth does 
not react to it, if both do not renounce to continu-
ously and technically re-set materials and already 
obtained “figures” of historical truth. This dynam-
ic, it seems to me, provides for the central theme 
of the “setting” or thesis of the work an essential 
link between the state of appearance and the reve-
latory calibre of that which appears. To under-
stand this dynamic, however, it is not enough to 
refer to the fact that what appears reveals itself 
both in its opening (its character as “world”) and 
in its closing (or its character as “earth”). It is also 
necessary to enquire to what extent the uncon-
cealing effect of the work of art regards not only 
the world as an opening of sense, but the earth in 
its double function as delimiting site of the open-
ing and of «specific and material production» of 
the disclosure. According to Heidegger, «the work 
moves the earth itself into the Open of a world 
and keeps it there» (OWA, 45; italics mine). It is 
this, we recall, that distinguishes the work from 
the means, with which it shares the being-done. 
When we read «in the creation of a work, the con-
flict, as rift, must be set back into the earth, and 
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the earth itself must be set forth and used as the 
self-closing factor. This use, however, does not use 
up or misuse the earth as matter, but rather sets it 
free to be nothing but itself. […] it is at all times 
a use of the earth in the fixing in place of truth in 
the figure», (OWA, 62) the accent is put not only 
on the material consistency of the opening, but on 
the fact that in the production the material itself 
is placed and revealed as such and can contribu-
te in an essential way to determining concretely a 
historical truth that remains lacking in sense if it 
is not rendered able to ‘install itself ’ in concrete 
ways. The setting-here of the work thus regards 
the rooting of the display in a determinacy and 
specificity, the sense of terrain, so to speak, of the 
opening, the determinacy that a sense acquires 
finding a “here”, a place from which to allow the 
sparking, the placing of presence, but also a con-
dition of opacity, insofar something known (and 
ordinary) is reproposed and represented artisti-
cally.
It is not by chance that the essence of the 
work of art must ultimately be «fixed» in a fig-
ure (Gestalt), i.e., Heidegger underlines, it must 
be led «back to earth», to a material and circum-
scribed concreteness. «What is here called figure, 
Gestalt, is always to be thought in terms of the 
particular placing (Stellen) and framing or frame-
work (Ge-stell) as which the work occurs when it 
sets itself up and sets itself forth» (OWA, 62). This 
is a decisive point in the author’s argumentation. 
The earth’s self-concealing equals the setup of a 
particular figure, allows the figure to be a specific 
opening of truth and not just an indeterminate 
or general opening. «The openness of this Open, 
that is, truth», Heidegger goes on «can be what 
it is, namely, this openness, only if and as long as 
it establishes itself within its Open […] In taking 
possession thus of the Open, the openness holds 
open the Open and sustains it. Setting and taking 
possession are here everywhere drawn from the 
Greek sense of thesis, which means a setting up in 
the unconcealed» (OWA, 59).
In short, the earth decides “the there” of that 
which is placed and appears, it renders that which 
reveals itself specific in its material and contextual 
rooting. The setting up of the truth entrusted by 
Heidegger to the work of art in other words can-
not but envisage, beyond the «setting up a world 
and setting forth the earth», a more explicit «keep-
ing there», as a positioning that gives rise to a spe-
cific material–formal configuration (the temple 
yesterday, the art installation today) that partici-
pates, as a situated presence, in the operation of 
punctual unconcealing of the truth of an epoch.
If the hypothesis set out here is correct, the 
“terrestrial” agency of art just described, as too 
the accent placed on its “operational” character, 
can contribute considerably to defining a possible 
concept of theatricality referred to the art instal-
lation: not a mise en scène, but a setting-here that 
repeats the gesture of occupying and delimiting, 
but also of qualifying and specifying truthfully 
sites and the art installation’s very presence, albeit 
variously oriented and with varying potentials 
linked to its modus operandi. This to the point of 
remaining valid also for those more recent instal-
lations that posit their own specificity under 
the title of a provocative but also very usable 
«theanyspacewhatever» (Pierre Huyghe): the set-
ting up of a theatre of operation, a battleground, 
not a mise en scène.
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